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ABSTRACT 
 
Perhaps the law review literature does not need 
another article on the Federal Circuit’s Bowers v. Baystate 
Technologies case. That case has received more than its 
share of attention from commentators, all criticizing Judge 
Rader’s majority opinion and most extolling the virtues of 
Judge Dyk’s dissent. Despite the storm of scholarly 
criticism, however, courts have followed Judge Rader’s 
opinion. This Article tells the untold story of why courts 
have been wise to do so. The Article explains how 
commentators have argued that federal intellectual 
property law should have preempted Bowers’ claims for 
breach of a shrinkwrap license prohibition on reverse 
engineering. Instead, Judge Rader’s majority opinion 
eliminated Bowers’ copyright claim by refusing to award 
Bowers any remedies for copyright infringement and hinted 
that in many instances contract damages for breach of a 
prohibition on reverse engineering would be de minimus. 
By using remedies rather than federal law preemption, 
Judge Rader’s approach achieved a result that was fairer 
to the parties and more congruent with sound innovation 
policy and the business of innovation. 
  
                                                                                                         
* Washington Law Foundation Professor of Law; Faculty Director of the 
Law, Technology & Arts Group, University of Washington School of Law. I am 
very grateful to Steve Calandrillo, Jonathan Franklin, Signe Naeve, and Peter 
Lee for their useful feedback. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Perhaps the law review literature does not need another article 
on the Federal Circuit’s Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. 
case.1 That case has received more than its share of attention from 
commentators, all criticizing Judge Rader’s majority opinion and 
most extolling the virtues of Judge Dyk’s dissent.2
                                                                                                         
1 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003). 
 Despite the 
2 See, e.g., David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption After 
Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 644 (2004) (Professor 
Rice not only criticized the Bowers decision, he predicted that either courts 
would not follow it or that Congress would correct the Federal Circuit’s 
approach); Christopher M. Kaiser, Comment, Take it or Leave it: Monsanto v. 
McFarling, Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, and the Federal Circuit’s 
Formalistic Approach to Contracts of Adhesion, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 487 
(2005); Jonathan Wilson, Case Note, Can a Copyright Holder Prevent Reverse 
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storm of scholarly criticism, however, courts have followed Judge 
Rader’s opinion.3 This Article tells the untold story of why courts 
have been wise to do so. It shows how Judge Rader’s approach 
assures that intellectual property and contract law work in tandem 
to foster the business of innovation.4
Following this Introduction, the Article sets out the historical 
backdrop of the Bowers case. It explains how the Federal Circuit 
decided the Bowers case in the midst of intense industry-wide 
debates about the enforceability of mass-market software licenses 
and the importance of reverse engineering in software innovation. 
Following the historical backdrop, the Article describes the key 
facts and rulings of the Bowers case. Finally, the Article explains 
how commentators have argued that federal intellectual property 
law should have preempted Bowers’ claims for breach of a 
shrinkwrap license prohibition on reverse engineering. Instead, 
Judge Rader’s majority opinion eliminated Bowers’ copyright 
claim by refusing to award Bowers any remedies for copyright 
infringement and hinted that in many instances contract damages 
for breach of a prohibition on reverse engineering would be de 
minimus. By using remedies rather than federal law preemption, 
Judge Rader’s approach achieved a result that was fairer to the 
parties and more congruent with freedom of contract and sound 
 
                                                                                                         
Engineering? The Federal Circuit Court Holds that the Federal Copyright Act 
Does Not Preempt “No Reverse Engineering” Clauses, 8 COMP. L. REV. & 
TECH. J. 467 (2004); Merritt A. Gardiner, Note, Bowers v. Baystate 
Technologies: Using the Shrinkwrap License to Circumvent the Copyright Act 
and Escape Federal Preemption, 11 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 105 (2003); Bryan 
Seigworth, Comment, Injuring Competition and Impeding the Progress of 
Science: Why Bowers v. Baystate Technologies Was Wrongly Decided, 23 J.L. 
& COM. 205 (2004); Deanna L. Kwong, Note, The Copyright-Contract 
Intersection: SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc. & Bowers v. 
Baystate Technologies, Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349 (2003); Sara 
Bressman, Comment, Restricting Reverse Engineering Through Shrink-Wrap 
Licenses: Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 185 
(2003). 
3 See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
4 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has become an expert on deciding intellectual 
property licensing cases that deal with business model innovation. See Robert 
W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its 
Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199 (2009). 
3
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innovation policy. 
 
I. HISTORICAL BACKDROP: END USER LICENSES AND REVERSE 
ENGINEERING 
 
A.  End Users Licenses 
 
Today, nearly every software user knows that software comes 
with a license (often called an “End User License Agreement” or 
“EULA” for short). Software developers began using EULAs in 
the 1980s during the personal computer revolution when software 
became a mass-market product. For many years, the enforceability 
of EULAs seemed in doubt. Scholars argued against their 
enforceability on a variety of grounds.5
Beginning with the ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg case in 1996,
 
6 
however, courts began to enforce EULAs.7 By the time the Federal 
Circuit decided the Bowers case in 2003, courts enforced EULAs 
on a regular basis (unless the software licensor failed to give the 
user a meaningful opportunity to review the EULA or to manifest 
assent).8
                                                                                                         
5 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-friendly Mass 
Market Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 689-92 (2004) 
(summarizing the criticisms of EULAs, their benefits, and the cases that have 
ruled on their enforceability).  
 Nonetheless, dissatisfaction about the enforceability of 
6 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
7 For a case pre-dating ProCD, see Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software 
Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (enforcing one EULA in the initial 
transaction between a value-added reseller and a software publisher but refusing 
to enforce a different EULA in a subsequent transaction). 
8 See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459-60 
(2006) (“Every court to consider the issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses . . . 
enforceable. A majority of courts in the last ten years have enforced 
‘shrinkwrap’ licenses . . . . Finally, and more recently, an increasing number of 
courts have enforced ‘browsewrap’ licenses.”) (footnotes omitted); 
Gomulkiewicz, supra note 6, at 691-92; see, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’n 
Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J.) (enforcing the EULA in 
certain contexts but not others on contract formation grounds). For an 
explanation of how mass market licenses play a critical role in the free and open 
source software movement, see Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses 
License Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software Revolution and the 
Implications for Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179 (1999). 
4
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EULAs remained strong in many quarters.9 Yet attention moved 
from their general enforceability to the enforceability of certain 
terms, such as prohibitions on reverse engineering (the contract 
term at issue in Bowers).10
 
 
B.  Reverse Engineering 
 
Reverse engineering means “to study or analyze (a device, as a 
microchip for computers) in order to learn details of design, 
construction, and operation, perhaps to produce a copy or an 
improved version.”11 In the software context, reverse engineering 
includes de-compilation or disassembly of machine-readable object 
code to discover human-readable source code. A competitor can 
use information gleaned from reverse engineering to create either a 
competitive product or a compatible product. Many people have 
highlighted the virtues of reverse engineering.12 The Supreme 
Court has characterized reverse engineering as an “essential part of 
innovation.”13
Some intellectual property law doctrines support reverse 
engineering. Trade secret law considers reverse engineering a 
proper means of discovering information.
 
14
                                                                                                         
9 Scholarly criticism of EULAs continues. See, e.g., Elizabeth I. Winston, 
Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around Statutory Protection of 
Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93 (2006). 
 The Copyright Act 
10 Critics of EULAs also have challenged EULA limitations on the use and 
transfer of software, arguing that these limitations are inconsistent categorically 
with the Copyright Act’s “first sale” doctrine. This categorical challenge has 
been rejected several times, most recently by the Ninth Circuit in Vernor v. 
Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). See also UMG Recordings, Inc. 
v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling that under the facts of the 
case, the transaction constituted a Copyright Act first sale rather than a license). 
11 Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(quoting RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1993)); see also 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
12 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and 
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002). 
13 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 
(1989). 
14 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43; UNIFORM TRADE 
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often does not stand in the way of reverse engineering to discover 
ideas even when copying is involved. Several courts, including the 
Federal Circuit, have ruled that making intermediate copies of 
software to uncover unprotectable ideas may amount to a 
defensible “fair use” under the Copyright Act.15 In addition, the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act permits the circumvention of 
technological measures in some circumstances for the purpose of 
engaging in reverse engineering.16
Despite all the positive aspects of reverse engineering, it is 
important not to overstate its significance. In the software industry, 
reverse engineering object code to discover source code can be 
very time consuming and may not yield much useful information.
 
17
It is also important to place the discovery of information via 
reverse engineering in the broader context of trade secret law and 
practice. Contracts are a normal and necessary measure used to 
protect the secrecy of trade secret information.
 
In addition, a significant amount of technical information about 
software, including its source code, is available by license, 
including under various open source software licenses, through 
standards organizations, and in software development kits and 
developer tools products. 
18
                                                                                                         
SECRETS ACT § 1, official cmt. 
 Moreover, 
enforceable contracts foster the sharing of information by allowing 
trade secret holders to share confidential information with third 
15 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 
2000); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Bateman 
v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); see also DSC Communs. 
Corp. v. Pulse Communs., Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting 
that reverse engineering may be a fair use but not under all circumstances). 
16 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f); see S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 13 (1998). The 1991 
European Software Directive contains a specific exception for reverse 
engineering to achieve interoperability and explicitly invalidates contractual 
provisions to the contrary. Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the Legal 
Protection of Software Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 44. 
17 See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Reverse Engineering of Software: Separating 
Legal Mythology from Actual Technology, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 331, 342-43 (1992). 
18 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174 
(7th Cir. 1991). 
6
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parties in a way that retains the information’s secrecy.19
Software developers often view their source code as a valuable 
trade secret and thus use contracts to bolster the secrecy that is 
inherent in distributing only the machine-readable object code. In 
other words, when software developers distribute software in 
object code form, they often do so because this form does not 
reveal secrets contained in the source code.
 Trade 
secret law does not treat the acquisition of information by breach 
of contract as proper. To the contrary, acquiring information 
through breach of contract constitutes an illegal misappropriation 
of trade secrets. 
20
Sometimes these trade secret-related contracts are called non-
disclosure agreements (NDAs). Now that software has become a 
mass-market item, EULAs also have become an important legal 
tool to protect the secrecy of source code. EULAs, like NDAs, 
protect the secrecy of software by contract. 
 Knowing that the 
software user could potentially discover the secrets by de-
compiling the object code, software developers get users to agree 
contractually that they will not reverse engineer the object code. 
Against this backdrop, the Federal Circuit decided the Bowers 
case. The case pits the enforceability of EULAs against the 
practice of reverse engineering. To those who question the 
enforceability of EULAs and revere the practice of reverse 
engineering, this case represented an opportunity for the court to 
rule that EULAs could not be enforced to prohibit reverse 
engineering. To those who count on the enforceability of EULAs 
to protect the secrecy of source code information, the case 
represented an opportunity for the court to uphold this method of 
contracting as an essential tool in the business of innovation.21
                                                                                                         
19 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974). 
 
20 See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F.Supp. 340, 
359 (D. Mass. 1993) (upholding jury verdict finding that Grumman had 
misappropriated trade secrets contained in object code form of Data General’s 
software even though software had been distributed on the open market, 
suggesting that distribution in object code form alone may suffice to retain trade 
secrecy). 
21 Interestingly, the major amicus brief arguing against the enforcement of 
EULAs to prohibit reverse engineering (written by Professor Mark Lemley and 
submitted by, among others, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, American 
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II. FACTS AND RULINGS OF BOWERS V. BAYSTATE TECHNOLOGIES 
 
A.  Facts 
 
Harold L. Bowers created a template to improve the operation 
of computer aided design (CAD) software used by engineers. 
Bowers’ template is not a “stand alone” technology; instead, it 
works in conjunction with CAD software such as Cadkey, Inc.’s 
CADKEY tool. Bowers received a patent for his template in 1990 
and (due to prior art) a reexamination certificate in 1997. He 
commercialized his template as the “Cadjet.” 
George W. Ford III envisioned a way to improve Bowers’ 
technology. Ford created an add-on software program to insert 
certain technical tolerance information into designs generated by 
CAD software. Ford’s software was particularly useful for creating 
CAD designs compliant with tolerance standards promulgated by 
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Ford called his 
software “Geodraft.” 
In 1989, Ford decided to rely on Bowers to commercialize 
Geodraft. Ford granted Bowers an exclusive license to the 
Geodraft software, which Bowers bundled with Cadjet to create 
what he called the “Designer’s Toolkit.” Bowers licensed the 
Designer’s Toolkit under a shrinkwrap license that, among other 
things, prohibited reverse engineering. At about the same time, 
Baystate Technologies developed and marketed various tools for 
CADKEY. One of those tools, called Draft-Pak, featured a 
template and software that performed some of the same functions 
as Designer’s Toolkit. 
                                                                                                         
Library Association, Computer and Communications Industry Association, and 
thirty-three intellectual property law professors) seems to concede that EULAs 
can be used to protect trade secrets. According to the brief: “Amici do not argue 
that shrinkwrap licenses that diverge from the Copyright Act are always 
preempted, nor that all shrinkwrap restrictions on reverse engineering are 
preempted. In some circumstances, such as in a true trade secret context, a 
restriction on reverse engineering may be consistent with copyright policy.” 
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition For Panel Rehearing and Rehearing 
En Banc of Defendant-Appellant Baystate Technologies, Inc. at 4, Bowers v. 
Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 01-1108, 01-1109). 
8
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In 1988 and 1989 Bowers offered to enter into a business 
relationship with Baystate that included the right to bundle his 
template with Draft-Pak. Baystate rejected Bowers’ overture, 
telling Bowers that it had “the in-house capability to develop the 
type of products you have proposed.”22 After Bowers released 
Designer’s Toolkit in 1990, Baystate obtained copies and reversed 
engineered it.23
Needless to say, this new version of Draft-Pak created intense 
price competition between Bowers and Baystate. To compete with 
Baystate, Bowers changed his marketing strategy. He entered into 
an agreement with Cadkey, Inc. for it to provide Designer’s 
Toolkit free of charge with CADKEY. Bowers hoped to recoup his 
profits by selling software upgrades to CADKEY customers (a 
common business strategy for sellers of add-on products). 
 Three months after obtaining the copies of 
Designer’s Toolkit, Baystate released an updated version of Draft-
Pak that incorporated many of the features of Designer’s Toolkit. 
Baystate pressured Cadkey, Inc. into repudiating its 
distribution agreement with Bowers. Next, Baystate purchased 
Cadkey, Inc. and “eliminated Mr. Bowers from the CADKEY 
network—effectively preventing him from developing and 
marketing the Designer’s Toolkit for that program.”24
 
 On top of 
that, Baystate sued Bowers for declaratory judgment that his patent 
was invalid and unenforceable and that Baystate’s products did not 
infringe. Bowers filed counterclaims for patent infringement, 
copyright infringement, and breach of contract. 
B.  Rulings 
 
1. Trial Court Rulings 
 
Following trial, the jury found for Bowers and awarded him 
damages: $1,948,869 for copyright infringement, $3,831,025 for 
breach of contract, and $232,977 for patent infringement. The 
district court, however, set aside the copyright damages as 
                                                                                                         
22 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1321. 
23 Id. at 1326-27 (court finds substantial evidence to support jury’s finding 
that Baystate reverse engineered Designer’s Toolkit). 
24 Id. at 1322. 
9
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duplicative of the contract damages. The judge did so because he 
had instructed the jury that Baystate’s reverse engineering could 
only violate Bowers’ contract if Baystate’s product infringed 
Bowers’ copyright.25
 
 
2. Initial Federal Circuit Ruling and Response to It 
 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on 
breach of contract and duplicative damages26 but reversed its 
ruling on patent infringement, in a unanimous opinion written by 
Judge Rader and joined by Judges Clevenger and Dyk.27 That 
opinion alarmed several interest groups and many intellectual 
property law professors. They joined the case as amici curiae28 in a 
motion for panel rehearing and rehearing by the Federal Circuit en 
banc. Professor Mark Lemley served as counsel of record for the 
amici. The main thrust of the amici was that the Federal Circuit 
should consider the possibility of Supremacy Clause-based federal 
law preemption (often called “conflict preemption”) as well as 
preemption based on § 301 of the Copyright Act. Although the 
amici brief contains many dire warnings about the enforcement of 
contractual prohibitions on reverse engineering, it concludes: 
“Amici do not suggest reversal of the Panel’s decision. We merely 
urge the Court to consider conflict preemption, and to clarify that 
in some cases the need for ‘national uniformity in the realm of 
intellectual property,’ Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162, requires 
preemption of shrinkwrap license terms.”29
 
 
                                                                                                         
25 This instruction was erroneous because reverse engineering can involve 
use of both copyrightable and un-copyrightable material. As described infra, 
Judge Rader’s opinion treated this as a harmless error. 
26 Because of its rulings in the breach of contract and damages portions of 
the case, the Federal Circuit did not reach the merits of the copyright 
infringement claim. 
27 Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
28 Amici included, among others, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
American Library Association, American Association of Law Libraries, 
Computer and Communications Industry Association, Digital Future Coalition, 
and 33 intellectual property law professors. 
29 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 10. 
10
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3. Federal Circuit Ruling After Rehearing—A Revised Opinion 
and Judge Dyk’s Dissent 
 
The Federal Circuit panel issued a revised opinion written by 
Judge Rader. This time, Judge Dyk filed a separate opinion, 
joining the majority except for dissenting “insofar as it holds that 
the contract claim is not preempted by federal law.”30 Judge Dyk 
agreed with the majority that parties can “contract away a fair use 
defense” or agree “not to engage in uses of copyrighted material 
that are permitted by the copyright law.” 31 However, Judge Dyk’s 
dissent drew a sharp distinction between “freely negotiated” 
contracts and shrinkwrap licenses whose enforcement, he believed, 
would be “no different in substance from a hypothetical black dot 
law.”32
 
 
4. Judge Rader’s Majority Opinion 
 
Judge Rader’s majority opinion framed the key issue in the 
case as whether the Copyright Act should “preempt or narrow the 
scope of Mr. Bowers’ contract claim.”33 The court held that it 
should not. To reach this conclusion, the court began in a familiar 
place: with freedom of contract. Judge Rader’s opinion noted that 
“[c]ourts respect freedom of contract and do not lightly set aside 
freely-entered agreements.”34
He acknowledged that at times “federal regulation may 
preempt private contract”
 
35
                                                                                                         
30 Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 and noted that the Copyright Act 
provides such a possibility. That possibility does not arise, 
however, so long as a state cause of action requires an “extra 
element” beyond mere copying, preparation of derivative works, 
distribution, or public performance or display. That said, Judge 
Rader acknowledged that not every “extra element” would 
31 Id. at 1336. 
32 Id. at 1337. 
33 Id. at 1323 (majority opinion). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1323-34. 
11
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establish a difference qualitative enough to survive Copyright Act 
preemption—some extra elements will prove to be illusory or mere 
labels. 
Citing cases from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth 
circuits, Judge Rader’s opinion observed that “most courts to 
examine this issue have found that the Copyright Act does not 
preempt contractual constraints on copyrighted articles.”36 That is 
because the mutual assent and consideration involved in contracts 
typically make them qualitatively different than copyrights. In 
addition, contracts are not a right against the world (like a 
copyright) but instead only affect the contracting parties. 
Moreover, Judge Rader’s opinion did not view private contracts, 
even non-negotiated shrinkwrap licenses, as state government 
legislation interfering with the goals of federal copyright law, a 
circumstance which had led the Fifth Circuit to preempt a 
Louisiana statute in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.37
Judge Rader’s opinion acknowledged that a person who reverse 
engineers software might be able to successfully assert a Copyright 
Act fair use defense but ruled that private parties “are free to 
contractually forego the limited
 
38 ability to reverse engineer a 
software product under the exemptions of the Copyright Act.”39
The most significant aspect of Judge Rader’s opinion is also 
the most overlooked—the part that deals with remedies. Finding 
that Bowers suffered financial harm at the hands of Baystate, the 
jury had awarded damages for breach of contract, copyright 
infringement, and patent infringement. Judge Rader’s opinion 
notes that it was proper for the jury to award damages both for 
infringement and breach of contract, leaving it to the trial judge to 
make appropriate adjustments to avoid double recovery. As 
mentioned previously, the district court judge did just that, setting 
 
With that, the Federal Circuit turned its attention to whether 
Baystate had breached the contract with Bowers. It took little effort 
to find substantial evidence that Baystate had. 
                                                                                                         
36 Id. 
37 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). 
38 “Limited” because the cases supporting reverse engineering as a fair use 
do not endorse all such practices in all settings. 
39 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325-26. 
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aside the copyright damages as duplicative. Judge Rader’s opinion 
affirmed the trial judge’s decision to set aside the copyright 
damages. The Federal Circuit also found no patent infringement, 
so the court set the patent infringement damages aside as well. At 
the end of the case, therefore, Bowers received only damages for 
breach of contract.40
This Section concludes with another important remedies-
related aspect of Judge Rader’s opinion. I will call it “Rader’s 
Hint.” Rader’s Hint is that: 
 
[o]f course, a party bound by such a contract may 
elect to efficiently breach the agreement in order to 
ascertain ideas in a computer program unprotected 
by copyright law. Under such circumstances, the 
breaching party must weigh the benefits of breach 
against the arguably de minimus damages arising 
from merely discerning non-protected code.41
 
 
III. BOWERS V. BAYSTATE: A BETTER BALANCE THROUGH 
REMEDIES 
 
A.  Intellectual Property Law Balance 
 
Everyone would agree that courts should work to maintain the 
careful balance in intellectual property laws between exclusive 
rights and the public domain.42
Courts maintain the balance in intellectual property laws 
 The critics of Bowers urge courts to 
maintain this balance by using federal law preemption to refuse to 
enforce standard form contractual prohibitions on reverse 
engineering. What the critics fail to appreciate, however, is that in 
Bowers the court did tend to the careful balance in intellectual 
property laws but it used a different and, I believe, a superior 
approach. The key to the Federal Circuit’s approach is remedies. 
                                                                                                         
40 It is also important to note that Bowers did not receive injunctive relief 
for breach of copyright. 
41 Id. at 1326. 
42 In the setting of the Bowers case, the Federal Circuit needed to balance 
the protection of trade secrets, access to unprotectable ideas and information that 
can be gleaned from reverse engineering, and freedom and certainty of contract. 
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through their work in both the liability and remedies aspects of an 
intellectual property infringement case. Commentators often 
overlook the remedies portion of the equation.43
With this in mind, let’s compare Judge Rader’s remedies-based 
approach (“Remedies Approach”) to the preemption-based 
approach suggested by Judge Dyk (“Preemption Approach”). 
Using a Remedies Approach, Bowers received only damages for 
breach of contract—the trial court (affirmed by the Federal Circuit) 
set aside copyright infringement damages and the Federal Circuit 
set aside patent infringement damages (finding no infringement). 
Under a Preemption Approach, Bowers would have received no 
damages whatsoever because the contractual prohibition on reverse 
engineering would not be enforceable and Baystate’s use would be 
shielded under the Copyright Act as a fair use. To put it another 
way, the Remedies Approach forced Baystate to pay Bowers for 
using Bowers’ information but the Preemption Approach would 
have allowed Baystate to use Bowers’ information free of charge. 
Which is the better outcome, looking at the effects on intellectual 
property law balance and the business of innovation? 
 They forget that 
evaluating the soundness of an intellectual property case (like 
Bowers) involves looking not just at the court’s treatment of 
liability, but also at whether the remedies awarded are fair to the 
intellectual property holder and not excessive from the standpoint 
of the infringer. You cannot fully assess if the court “got it right” 
until you see whether the court grants an injunction and/or awards 
damages. Even if a court finds liability for infringement, if it 
refuses to grant an injunction or award damages, the intellectual 
property holder has gained little or nothing tangible from its 
intellectual property right. To put it differently, in a de minimus 
damages, no-injunction scenario, the user of the intellectual 
property is realistically free to use the “intellectual property” as if 
it were in the public domain. 
                                                                                                         
43 But see Orit F. Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract 
Failures in Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2011); Peter Lee, 
The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39 (2008). See 
also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Enforcement of Open Source Licenses: The 
MDY Trio’s Inconvenient Complications, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106 (2011) 
(arguing for a remedies-based approach).  
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Let’s begin with the basic concern that the ruling in Bowers v. 
Baystate deprives the public of ideas and information. To the 
extent that such information is a trade secret, the law fully supports 
and encourages the use of contracts as a means to protect trade 
secrets. The amici in Bowers agreed with this proposition.44
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that the amount of non-
trade secret information protected by a no-reverse-engineering 
EULA term is significant. Neither the Preemption Approach nor 
the Remedies Approach prevents the discovery or use of such 
information. Naturally, the Preemption Approach would permit 
discovery and use of the information but so would the Remedies 
Approach if a party elects the “efficient breach” route suggested by 
Rader’s Hint.
 Given 
the broad scope of information that can be protected as a trade 
secret, in reality the amount of non-trade secret information 
hoarded by a contractual prohibition on reverse engineering will be 
insignificant in many cases. 
45
Moreover, Rader’s Hint suggests that, as a practical matter, the 
information gained by breach of a no-reverse-engineering clause 
may be used for free (or nearly so) on many occasions. According 
to Rader’s Hint, often the damages “arising from merely discerning 
non-protected code”
  
46 will be de minimus.47
                                                                                                         
44 According to the amici brief: “Amici do not argue that shrinkwrap 
licenses that diverge from the Copyright Act are always preempted, nor that all 
shrinkwrap restrictions on reverse engineering are preempted. In some 
circumstances, such as in a true trade secret context, a restriction on reverse 
engineering may be consistent with copyright policy.” Brief of Amici Curiae, 
supra note 21, at 4.   
 That said, the 
Remedies Approach leaves open the possibility that, under certain 
circumstances, parties who reverse engineer may need to pay in 
45 Admittedly, some parties contemplating whether to reverse engineer will 
abstain out of fear of an unduly large damage award or the expense of litigation 
to prove that damages are de minimus. This chilling is not ideal, of course. A 
related concern with the Damages Approach is the often speculative nature of 
damages in many intellectual property cases. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 
1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, the point of this Article is not that the 
Damages Approach is perfect, but that it is better overall than the Preemption 
Approach. 
46 That is, code not protected by patent, copyright, or trade secret. 
47 Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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damages for use of information gained via breach of contact. 
This brings us to the heart of the matter: Is innovation better 
served by the “always free” Preemption Approach or the “often 
free” Remedies Approach? The Preemption Approach’s “always 
free” use of reverse-engineered information encourages maximal 
discovery and use to be sure, but does maintaining balance in the 
intellectual property laws really demand this approach? Or does an 
“always free” approach actually skew the balance and create 
significant problems for the business of innovation? The Bowers v. 
Baystate case serves as a useful real-world case to test these 
hypothetical questions. 
 
B.  A Remedies Approach Creates the Best Balance 
 
I believe Judge Rader’s opinion in the Bowers case 
demonstrates the superiority of the Remedies Approach for two 
reasons. First, it creates a better overall climate for the business of 
innovation. Second, it allows courts to decide cases fairly and 
leaves it to legislatures to create appropriate exceptions to the 
enforcement of licenses. 
 
1. Better Climate for Business Model Innovation 
 
A careful reading of the Bowers case reveals that Judge 
Rader’s approach maximized the opportunities for both Baystate 
and Bowers to compete in the innovation business. The law did not 
prevent Baystate from discovering and using Bowers’ information, 
and Baystate benefited financially from this information. For 
example, the information undoubtedly gave Baystate a time-to-
market advantage and allowed Baystate to conserve resources that 
it otherwise would have used in independent development. 
Furthermore, we can even infer that, at least indirectly, Baystate 
used these financial benefits toward the acquisition of Cadkey, 
Inc., an acquisition that Baystate used to put Bowers and Ford out 
of the CADKEY add-on business. It is interesting to note that on 
appeal Baystate did not challenge the amount of the contract 
damages that the jury awarded—this provides at least some 
16
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/9
2012] THE UNTOLD STORY OF BOWERS V. BAYSTATE TECHNOLOGIES 461 
 
indication48 that the damages award was not excessive relative to 
the value Baystate received from using Bowers’ information.49
The contract damages award that Bowers received likely also 
led to good things for the business of innovation. Bowers could 
have put his damages award to productive use as seed money for 
his next business venture. Some of the money may have gone to 
Ford as well. The Preemption Approach, by contrast, would have 
left Bowers without that seed capital, either keeping him on the 
sidelines or forcing him to start his next venture in a relatively 
weak financial position. 
 
Would it have been better for the business of innovation if the 
court permitted Baystate to use Bowers’ information free of charge 
(which would be the outcome under a Preemption Approach)? 
Some commentators would argue “yes,” focusing on the intense 
price competition that resulted when Baystate introduced a product 
that competed with Bowers.50
In addition to producing a sound result for innovation under the 
facts of the Bowers case, in a broader sense Judge Rader’s opinion 
bolsters the interworking of two key elements of business model 
innovation in the software industry: intellectual property and 
contract. Naturally, Judge Rader recognizes the importance of 
intellectual property in the software business (although his opinion 
carefully limits the power of the exclusive rights by dismissing the 
 Such competition was short lived, 
however, because Baystate put Bowers and Ford out of the 
CADKEY add-on business. In the end, consumers had only one 
choice—Baystate. 
                                                                                                         
48 There are many tactical reasons for not raising an issue on appeal so I do 
not want to make too much of this fact.  
49 It is possible that Bowers was entitled to additional damages for breach of 
contract. Since the district court judge instructed the jury that contract damages 
were coextensive with copyright damages for breach of the prohibition on 
reverse engineering, Bowers did not have the chance to recover damages 
unrelated to copyright infringement. So, for example, Bowers did not recover 
damages related to use of non-copyrightable ideas or information, including 
information held as a trade secret. Bowers did not raise this on appeal. Bowers, 
320 F.3d at 1322. Moreover, Bowers did not bring a claim for trade secret 
misappropriation. 
50 See David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption After Bowers v. 
Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 623 (2004). 
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duplicative copyright damages award and the patent infringement 
suit). Judge Rader also recognizes the importance of freedom of 
contract and certainty of contract to creating a vibrant climate for 
business model innovation. As I have described elsewhere, 
innovation in the business models used to bring technology to 
market is just as important as the innovation that goes into building 
the technology.51 Freedom and certainty of contract are key 
ingredients supporting business model innovation.52 Moreover, as 
discussed previously, enforceable contracts are essential to trade 
secret protection, which is an important type of protection in the 
software industry, particularly for small enterprises.53
Even so, Judge Rader’s opinion acknowledges that there may 
be times when federal regulation trumps freedom and certainty of 
contract.
 
54 However, a Remedies Approach does a better job of 
policing the limits of contract law than the Preemption Approach. 
Some commentators describe preemption as a sledge hammer used 
to kill a gnat.55 Specifically, Judge Dyk’s dissent suggests that the 
preemption sledge hammer should kill every prohibition-on-
reverse-engineering “gnat” contained in a shrinkwrap license.56
                                                                                                         
51 Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law 
Jurisprudence: Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 204-08 (2009). 
  
52 Judge Rader’s opinion in McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917 
(Fed. Cir. 1995), nicely illustrates how contract law remedies in intellectual 
property licensing can burden and benefit licensors as well as licensees. In 
allowing the licensee to utilize the contract remedy of resale, Judge Rader’s 
opinion saw “no reason why the owner of intellectual property rights deserves to 
evade application of the ordinary contract remedy of resale for an unjustified 
refusal to pay” and emphasized that “Intellectual property owners ‘may contract 
as they choose’ . . . but their intellectual property rights do not entitle them to 
escape the consequences of dishonoring state contractual obligations.” Id. at 
922. 
53 See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 35 (5th ed. 2010). 
54 Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
55 See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of 
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 145 (1999);  see also J.H. 
Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property 
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of 
Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 920-22 (1999). 
56 Note that the amici brief did not go that far. Amici did not urge the 
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The weakness of the Preemption Approach is that it pays no 
attention to the nuances of the business setting, such as: How 
sophisticated is the licensee? Is the licensee a business or a 
consumer? Is the licensee a competitor or an end user? Did the 
licensee know about the prohibition on reverse engineering? Is the 
information discovered being used to create an interoperable 
product or a competitive one? Was the information available by 
other means? Is the information a trade secret of the licensor? The 
answers to all these questions matter as courts seek to maintain a 
proper balance in intellectual property laws as well as to foster the 
business of innovation. 
The best way to illustrate the shortcomings of the Preemption 
Approach is to look at the outcome in a particularly unsympathetic 
case:  where a large, sophisticated, well-capitalized business 
reverse engineers the software of a small, unsophisticated, 
undercapitalized entrepreneur and uses that information to compete 
with the entrepreneur. The Preemption Approach creates a rule 
where courts must always allow large, sophisticated, well-
capitalized businesses to breach, without penalty, the no-reverse-
engineering clauses in standard form contracts of small, 
unsophisticated, undercapitalized entrepreneurs. I doubt this 
outcome is needed to maintain balance in intellectual property laws 
or is useful in fostering the business of innovation. The superior 
approach, it seems, is to allow courts to look at all the facts, award 
damages for breach of contract when appropriate, and allow parties 
to breach contractual provisions with unfettered impunity only 
when it is clearly necessary to protect our system of innovation.57
 
 
                                                                                                         
Federal Circuit to reverse the ruling against Baystate but “merely urge[d] the 
Court to consider conflict preemption, and to clarify that in some cases the need 
for national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property” requires preemption 
of shrinkwrap license terms. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 21, at 10 (quotes 
and citation removed) (emphasis added). 
57 For example, commentators have argued that the most compelling case 
arises when someone seeks information simply to interoperate with a product or 
technology, particularly with a product or technology that dominates a market. 
See Daniel Laster, The Secret is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market 
License Terms Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes, 58 
BAYLOR L. REV. 621 (2006). 
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2. Courts Decide Cases, Legislatures Make Laws 
 
Fundamentally, Bowers v. Baystate is a case about a real 
businessman, Harold Bowers, who suffered real harm at the hands 
of a competitor who breached a contract. The jury and trial court 
judge did their best to remedy the situation by awarding Bowers 
monetary damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed that result. While 
it is true that this outcome had an impact on innovation policy writ 
large, the court’s primary task was to apply the law to do justice 
for the parties before it. That’s what the trial court did and that’s 
the approach Judge Rader’s opinion for the Federal Circuit took. 
Fundamentally, critics of Judge Rader’s opinion in Bowers 
want something that a legislative body, not courts, should provide: 
an exception to the general rule that courts will enforce contractual 
choice (“Enforcement Exception”). Specifically, they want an 
Enforcement Exception that would void prohibitions on reverse 
engineering presented in a standard form EULA. 
Indeed, the European Union has enacted an Enforcement 
Exception in its Software Directive.58 In the United States, 
members of Congress have proposed an Enforcement Exception, 
but Congress has never enacted it.59
The amici brief in Bowers and several commentators cited the 
latter legislative activity as support for their argument that courts 
should create an Enforcement Exception. Judge Rader’s opinion 
looked at this same legislative activity and seems to have come to 
the opposite conclusion—that without legislation enacted by 
Congress or a state legislature, courts should continue to enforce 
standard form contracts in the normal manner. Although not 
articulated in Judge Rader’s opinion, his approach follows 
 The National Conference of 
Commissions on Uniform State Laws also added an Enforcement 
Exception to the revised version of the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act (UCITA), but that version of UCITA 
has not been enacted by any state. 
                                                                                                         
58 Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the Legal Protection of Software 
Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 44. 
59 This is the so-called “Boucher Bill,” proposed by Representative Rick 
Boucher of Virginia. See Digital Era Copyright Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. 
(1998). 
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traditional notions of judicial deference to legislatures in 
intellectual property law60 and is consistent with judicial canons of 
interpreting legislative inaction.61
 
 
IV. FINAL REFLECTION 
 
My analysis of Bowers finishes with a provocative reflection: 
that despite all the critical commentary following the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Bowers, Judge Rader’s opinion gave the amici 
exactly what they asked for. 
Recall that the amici did not call on the Federal Circuit to 
reverse the trial court’s award of damages for breach of contract. 
They did not assert that shrinkwrap licenses that diverge from 
copyright are always preempted or that all shrinkwrap restrictions 
on reverse engineering are preempted. They did not even take a 
position on whether conflict preemption should apply in the 
Bowers case. Instead, the amici “merely urge[d]” the Federal 
Circuit to do two things: (1) “consider” conflict preemption; and 
(2) “clarify” that in some cases the need for national uniformity in 
the realm of intellectual property requires preemption of 
shrinkwrap license terms. 
The Federal Circuit did in fact “consider” conflict preemption. 
Amici clearly, forcefully, and articulately presented the conflict-
preemption argument to the court in briefing and oral argument. 
However, the argument did not persuade the court, not even Judge 
Dyk, who seems to have based his dissent on § 301 preemption 
rather than conflict preemption.62
                                                                                                         
60 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990). 
 While it is true that neither Judge 
Rader’s majority opinion nor Judge Dyk’s dissent discusses 
conflict preemption, that does not mean the judges did not consider 
61 See 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 49:10 (7th ed.); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Patterson v. McLean: Interpreting Legislative 
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988). Commentators note, however, that 
interpreting legislative inaction is tricky and controversial. See generally 
Lawrence H. Tribe, Toward Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of 
Congressional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).  
62 See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1317, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
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it; a perfectly reasonable explanation for their omission is that they 
did not find the argument persuasive.63
Judge Rader’s opinion does, in effect, “clarify” that shrink 
wrap license terms may be preempted. The opinion does not make 
the clarification overtly through dicta which may be been what the 
amici were looking for. However, nothing in Judge Rader’s 
opinion rules out a preemption challenge. Moreover, the opinion 
states clearly that “. . . at times, federal regulation may preempt 
private contract.”
 
64
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Commentators worry that the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Bowers v. Baystate Technolgies created an environment that 
stymies innovation. Instead, the court created an environment that 
fosters it. Judge Rader’s opinion supports all the tools necessary 
for success in the business of innovation: freedom and certainty of 
contract; intellectual property protection; and the flow of ideas and 
information. In doing so, his opinion successfully balances 
incentives to invent and create with public policies on promoting 
competition. It is a wise approach and courts have been wise to 
follow it. 
                                                                                                         
63 See Merritt A. Gardiner, Comment, Bowers v. Baystate Technologies: 
Using the Shrinkwrap License to Circumvent the Copyright Act and Escape 
Federal Preemption, 11 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 105, 108 (2003) (“The Federal 
Circuit’s opinion is incomplete and fails to recognize the doctrine of conflict 
preemption. The court’s preemption analysis is, therefore, inconsistent with the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”); Deanna L. Kwong, Comment, 
The Copyright-Contract Intersection: SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, 
Inc. & Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349, 367 
(2003) (“The Federal Circuit’s preemption analysis in Bowers completely failed 
to consider constitutional preemption under the Supremacy Clause.”). 
64 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1323-24. 
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